I Will Stage A Coup D’état - Chapter 2



Only Noblemtl

EP.2 I’m going to stage a coup (2)

If there is a ‘methodology’ to everything in the world, then there will also be a ‘methodology’ to a coup d’état.

As a proud aspiring coup d’état, I looked back on the footsteps of the proud predecessors of the South Korean coup d’état.

First, let’s look at Park Chung-hee of May 16.

In the case of Army Major General Park Chung-hee, who initiated the May 16 coup, he was unable to prepare the coup meticulously.

The information was leaked in advance, and even civilian Prime Minister Jang Myeon was aware of the military’s suspicious movements.

As a result, as soon as the coup began, Colonel Lee Gwang-seon, the military police chief, surrounded the rebels’ headquarters, the 6th District Command, and attempted to arrest all key officers.

What saved the coup forces from crisis was not Park Chung-hee’s leadership, but the improvisation of the officers of the 8th class of the Korea Military Academy, the trolling of Chief of Staff Jang Do-young, and the indecisive response of the president and the prime minister.

In that respect, Park Chung-hee was not a suitable role model.

To be honest, I did take the successful coup d’état as an example.

Then, what about Chun Doo-hwan of December 12, who broke through more organized resistance than on May 16?

At the time of the 12.12 incident, the commander of the Security Command, Chun Doo-hwan, seized the power of the military intelligence agency, the Security Command, and achieved victory by overwhelming the suppression forces in terms of intelligence.

Of course, if there had been no private organization, ‘Hanahoe’, which had been nurtured over several decades, Chun Doo-hwan’s meticulous plan would not have been able to exert that much power.

However, if it had not been supported by the criminal incompetence of Minister of National Defense Noh Jae-hyun and the indecisive command of Vice Chief of Staff Yoon Sung-min, there would have been no chance of a successful coup even if there had been a Hanahoe, let alone a Hanahoe hal-ae-bi.

Simply put, the success of the ‘Korean-style coup’ required the element of incompetence on the part of the government and suppression forces.

In that respect, I had to point out one important fact.

Is this country, the Korean Empire, incapable of a coup?

Unfortunately for me, this country recently experienced a coup.

That wasn’t a very good thing for a would-be coup d’état.

Like most rebel leaders who stage a coup, the current Army Chief of Staff, Marshal Park Han-jin, was devoting his heart and soul to ‘preparing for a coup.’

He expanded and reorganized the existing Army Counterintelligence Command to create the ‘Army Security Command’ and installed direct factions in the Security Command and field units in the capital area.

Because Park Han-jin had built such a wall, it was impossible to prepare a proper coup.

If we exaggerate a little, there wouldn’t be enough space to fit even a toothpick.

‘Not right now.’

But when a natural disaster strikes, it’s a different story.

In times of war, i.e. wartime situations, units are expanded/redeployed or rotated/replaced.

And at that moment, the regime’s grip on the military reveals its weakness.

Even if we just look at historical examples, this is true.

Even in the case of the Russian Revolution, the conditions for a rebellion were created when the guard units that the Tsar could certainly trust were sent to the front and new conscripted units took their place.

If a war broke out with China, it was possible that Korea would experience similar situations.

So, the opportunity is sure to come.

It is not an unfounded optimism, as there was an attempted coup d’état in the work around 1939.

In that case, preparation is necessary.

‘The most certain thing would be to create a private organization like Hanahwe.’

The problem was that Lee Seong-jun did not have such a private organization.

If there is one thing we have, it is the intangible element called ‘popularity’.

There was a high possibility that this popularity was just a ‘good-sounding compliment’ given to a general of royal descent.

I decided to borrow Jeong Gil’s objective perspective.

“Are you a high-ranking officer or general whom Your Majesty meets privately?”

“Yeah. People I see once a month, outside of my division or corps.”

“Oh, when you went to the Army, you had a meal with the chief of the military affairs department.”

“No, not like an army event or anything, but something I see privately.”

“There wasn’t any.”

huh?

Surely, Lee Seong-jun, this kid, lives in a country similar to Prussia without managing his military connections?

Wow, this kid is really living his life like crazy.

He’s a bigger punk than me.

If you do that, isn’t it scary?

‘Come to think of it, since I was a member of the royal family, I could live without worrying about anything.’

In this case, status was clearly a ‘penalty’ factor.

A ‘coup d’état’ by a military general who doesn’t put any effort into securing connections?

A coup d’état candidate is disqualified.

I’ve been thinking about how to overcome this serious situation.

What would it take to stage a ‘coup’ under these extremely harsh conditions?

I decided to look into the cases of foreign ‘coup seniors’.

In the case of Mustafa Kemal, the national popularity he gained from ‘Gallipoli’ allowed him to impose laws on Kostantinye (the capital of the Ottoman Empire) and become the head of state of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Napoleon, who was just another common general in the military, was chosen as Sieyès’ pawn in the Coup of Brumaire, but he won the position of First Consul on the basis of his national popularity.

The lesson here is that a politician’s popularity is a resource that can be converted into power.

‘I’m popular. There’s nothing I can’t do.’

I thought about overcoming the absence of a private organization with ‘national popularity.’

However, there was one problem.

How to gain national popularity in our Korean Empire.

“Ugh. Manchuria. I have expanded the living space of the Korean people!”

“Citizens! I have won war reparations from China!”

“Solidify factory operation rate through war! Support the military, the number one symbol of the war economy!”

Hmm. That was it.

However, it is difficult to differentiate yourself from these lunatics.

First, the national economy is in shambles, so there is no money to do anything.

Second, I am a soldier, not a politician.

Third, the answer the people want is the same as those lunatics.

They say that to become popular you have to be more of a hawk than those lunatics, and if you go full throttle like that you’ll be sentenced to death at a war crimes trial.

They’re trying to stage a coup just to survive, but it’s a bit of a turn-off.

I’m back to square one.

‘It’s not that clichés are loved differently.’

The cliché of a coup is ‘persuasion’.

Even Park Chung-hee, who left the first success story in the history of coup d’état in the Republic of Korea, diligently ‘persuaded’ high-ranking officers and generals, including those from the 5th, 8th, and 9th classes of the Korea Military Academy, to create a coup force.

Of course, persuasion had some disadvantages compared to private organizations.

1. There is a risk of information loss.

Park Chung-hee also suffered humiliation when information was leaked, and the 2016 Turkish coup d’état failed altogether.

2. It is difficult to determine the target of inclusion.

Unless you look into a person’s mind, you can never be 100% sure what he will do.

3. It takes a lot of time.

A private organization can act as soon as it decides, but persuasion cannot move until the work is done.

The reason many coups fail is because they are detected during the preparation stage.

‘That’s why differentiation is necessary.’

I had no intention of proposing a system of rewards and compensation that prioritizes profit over positions.

The core of ‘persuasion’, in my opinion, is presenting a vision for the future, that is, a blueprint for the future Korean Empire.

A typical example is the coup by the Young Turks, who declared that they would transform the Ottoman Empire into a ‘modern nation.’

I intended to sell the coup plotters, as the Young Turks had done, the ‘confidence’, the belief that I could lead the country on the right path.

The vision I propose is developmental dictatorship.

It is built on the three values ​​of ‘anti-communism, economic growth, and institutional modernization.’

In some ways, it is the same as benchmarking Park Geun-hye’s strategy for taking power.

But so what?

This country, the Korean Empire, is a country ruled by military thugs with a mindset that is not even up to that level.

Of course, I don’t know if I can carry out development dictatorship well.

If the US opens its markets and provides loans, we won’t be able to run wild like Park Geun-hye. That’s not true either.

Anyway, that’s something we’ll have to figure out when it happens.

‘The first priority is to create friends who can act as a kind of Young Turk Party.’

How can we recruit young officers without making a sound?

I soon arrived at the answer.

What are my strengths?

A writer, that is, a translator.

A person who makes a living writing books has to use his long-term skills.

First of all, I need to tell you what kind of person I am.

With what?

With books and newspapers.

That’s how I create followers by demonstrating my vision so clearly.

As my voice grows, those who are interested in my arguments will watch and even accept me as their leader.

“aide.”

“Yes, General.”

“Make an appointment to visit Korea Daily and Dong-A Ilbo by tomorrow.”

These two newspapers were representative dailies of Goryeo, and represented most of the empire’s conservative readers.

I planned to speak out to this conservative population.

The reason is that the military is conservative, so there was nothing special about it.

Of course, there were some progressive officers in the military, but they were a small number who had no influence on the general situation.

“Are you talking about the newspaper company?”

“okay.”

“All right.”

Oh, there was a radio too.

Why have we forgotten the greatest weapon that made Hitler chancellor?

Of course, it’s impossible for me, a writer, to become a speaker overnight.

The radio decided to take its time approach.

It’s not too late to think about making a move after raising public awareness.

‘I have to write a book, so I’m going to get busy.’

Of course, people around me will also be busy.

A general from the royal family who had been quiet for a while has begun to show political activity.

But for now, you can rest assured.

Because I have no intention of staging a coup ‘now’.

Everything comes after I’m ready.

‘I drew my sword once, but I sharpened it for over a decade.’

This is a line that Sima Yi left to his ancestors right after the Gaoping Mausoleum Incident in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms drama from long ago.

I, too, will start sharpening my sword from now on, just like Sima Yi.

For the day when the sword is drawn.